Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peerpunishment enhances cooperation in repeated public-good games, heavy punishment in early rounds leads to average period payos below the noncooperative equilibrium benchmark. If past payos determine present contribution capabilities, this may be devastating. Groups may fall prey to a poverty trap or, to avoid this, abstain from punishment altogether. In an experimental study of dynamic public good provision we show that although single groups do succumb to the above-mentioned hazards, neither is the case generally. By continuously contributing larger fractions of their wealth, groups with punishment possibilities achieve increasing wealth increments, while increments fall when punishment possibilities are absent.
1 The distinctive feature of our design is the endogeneity of players' contribution capabilities. Instead of providing subjects with (new) endowments in every round, they receive an initial endowment on their wealth account and subsequently play with whatever is currently on that account. Consequently, their payo does not consist of the sum of period payos, but it is given by the nal amount on their wealth account. Nikiforakis (2008) . Convex punishment technologies have also been used in other areas of economic research such as the law-and-economics literature, e.g., Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004) .
2 An interesting related study is that of Buckley and Croson (2006) who analyse the eect of information about the group members' accumulated wealth levels on contribution
The structure of the game has a number of interesting implications. First of all, it puts all the weight on the long run, which is another feature that sets us apart from earlier studies of dynamic elements in the provision of public goods. Notably, this leads to incentives for cooperation even in the absence of a punishment mechanism if at least a fraction of the players is motivated by social considerations. On the other hand, the introduction of a punishment mechanism could have devastating eects if future contribution capabilities are determined by present behavior, especially because early punishment has been shown to be particularly strong in experimental studies of peerpunishment mechanisms (cf., e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gürerk, et al., 2006; or Sefton et al., 2007) . Alternatively, potential punishers, being aware of this hazard, might refrain from sanctioning. As a consequence, play in the game with and without the punishment mechanism might not dier.
We nd that players do punish, leading to an initial disadvantage of groups with punishment possibilities as compared to groups that do not dispose of such possibilities. Groups with punishment possibility are able to keep players' contributed fractions of their current wealth at a constant level, whereas in the sanction-free environment, these fractions exhibit the typical declining trend. We do not observe any signicant dierences in the absolute level of public-good contributions at any point in time, which marks a stark contrast to earlier studies of public-good provision.
3 However, with punishment levels falling over time, wealth levels in the groups having punishment opportunities are able to catch up with those in the groups without. In contrast to the latter, average wealth levels in the former exhibit an increasing growth path, such that signicantly higher wealth and, consequently, contribution levels seem to be a question of an extension of the time horizon by a small number of rounds.
Related literature. There is a substantial theoretic literature on repeated social-dilemma games with earlier play inuencing later distributions of different (player) types in evolutionary settings. game eects were surprisingly limited.
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Noussair and Soo (2008) study public-good provision when the group's past cooperation level inuences each member's current marginal per-capita return of provision. This resembles a situation in which players' abilities to contribute to a public good is unrelated to the payo stemming from it, but the more cooperative the group has been in the past the higher is the return from future cooperation. In their setting, contribution levels generally do not exhibit the usual falling trend except for a minority of the groups. Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) consider a situation in which a group member's benet from the public good depends on the player's current wealth. This setup is well-tailored to their focus on inequality and situations prone to the accentuation of this inequality. Subjects' propensity to cooperate is not aected by the degree of inequality induced. In contrast, in a control treatment that does not involve a dynamic component, induced inequality has a positive eect on cooperation. They conclude that subjects' fairness concerns seem to be`crowded out' by the introduction of the dynamics.
Gächter et al. (2009) study dynamic public-good provision in a setting in
which the players' endowment in period t is determined by the player's payo in period t-1. They analyze the role of the dynamics and separate the eects of inequality, rising endowments, and endogeneity of evolving wealth levels.
In contrast to our study, nal payos are still given by the sum of all period payos. Unlike in the study of Noussair and Soo (2008) , groups in the main treatment of the study by tend to do worse than those in any of their`non-dynamic' control treatments. In particular, this holds for groups in which the endowment history was induced corresponding to the history of a randomly chosen`twin group' in the main treatment. This latter nding seems to be in line with the earlier ndings of Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) reported above. Battaglini et al. (2010) examine behavior in a durable-public-good setting. Their setup is close to ours except for a number of parameter choices and the fact that in their study, payos are given by the sum of period payos; only the public-good stock carries over from one period to the next.
Furthermore, their focus lies on whether agents play (eciency-enhancing) trigger strategies, and how behavior is inuenced by whether decisions are made independently or by some political mechanism such as majority voting.
They nd that even though there are equilibria sustaining high levels of cooperation in their game, the decentralized institution yields little cooperation 5 An early exception is Rapoport (1988) who examines how dierent information conditions aect behavior in a common-pool-resource game with depletion. He observes little cooperation, even though communication of an optimal strategy did have a positive eect on harvesting behavior.
as predicted by the Markov-equilibrium steady state. At the same time, a majority rule substantially increases the amount of cooperation, albeit not enough to achieve an ecient outcome.
In a recent study, Cadigan et We introduce the game-theoretic model underlying our experimental setting in section 2. We will lay out the standard game-theoretic solution to the game and point to a number of notable dierences of our dynamic setting to the usual static setting, where dynamic and static are meant to refer to endogenous and exogenous endowment determination, respectively. We will further discuss the eects social preferences would have on our predictions.
Finally, we will use two benchmark scenarios as our research hypotheses to span the range of possible outcomes. In section 3, we present the experimental procedure and design, followed by the presentation of our results in section 4. Section 5, nally, winds up with a discussion of our ndings and a pointer to the relevance of our benchmark scenarios.
2 Game-theoretic model For our investigation, we implement two dierent games, the dynPUN game and the dynNOpun game. Both games are dynamic games consisting of T rounds. In each round a public-good game is played. The games dier from a supergame with T repetitions of the stage games by two important aspects: (i) contribution capabilities depend on earlier play, and (ii) no roundly payos are paid. Instead, game payos are determined by the nal-round wealthlevels only.
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In the dynNOpun game, each round t, t = 1, ..., T , has exactly one stage 6 This is an important dierence to the study by , who implement (i) but not (ii). In their setup, roundly payos are paid as well as determining next-round endowments.
in which a standard public-good game with n players is played. In the rst round, each player is endowed with an identical amount of E tokens. The contribution capability, or current wealth, of a subsequent round t, E t i , corresponds to player i's last round's wealth Ω t−1 i plus a`recovery surplus' of m. In every round, each player i may contribute x t i tokens from her current wealth to a common project and keeps the remainder on a private account.
The total contributions are multiplied by nµ and divided evenly amongst the players in the group, so that the public good exhibits a constant marginal per-capita return of µ. Thus, player i's wealth Ω t i at the end of round t is:
In the dynPUN game, a second stage is added. After the rst stage, which is identical to that of the dynNOpun game, players are informed about all players' contribution decisions and may then assign punishment points to the other players in their group. By assigning p t ij points to player j, player i can reduce the round-t wealth of player j by p t ij . Punishment is not only costly for the punished, but also for the punisher. The assignment of p t ij points inicts costs of c(p t ij ) on player i. The cost function is a convex function that is positive for all positive values of p t ij and monotonically increasing. We set two further constraints on punishment: players cannot assign values of p t ij that would drive their own current account below zero, and they cannot drive other players' current account at the end of the round below zero. If they assign more points than necessary to eliminate another player's positive earnings, they nevertheless have to bear the full costs of their choice.
The resulting function determining player i's current wealth Ω t i at the end of round t is: 
Standard game-theoretic solution
The standard game-theoretic subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria of both games for rational selsh actors are obvious and equal to those of the corresponding `static' supergames, following directly from the typical backward-induction argument. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium, no player will make positive contributions, nor punish other players in case of the dynPUN game.
There is one notable dierence between the games presented here and their repeated-game counterpart with xed, recurring endowments. If in the repeated-game situation, an argument along the lines of Kreps et al. (1982) can be brought forward, the argument can be extended for our game. To see this, note that in our games, it may pay to contribute early on for a payo-maximizing player because contributions increase future contribution capabilities. If others can be expected to contribute in later stages be it because they follow a tit-for-tat strategy or simply because they are unconditionally altruistic increasing their contribution capabilities at the same time will increase the source on which to free-ride later on. The important dierence between the repeated game and our game is that contributing in early rounds is a best-response even to unconditional contributors.
Solution with social preferences
How does the solution of the game change if one assumes that subjects have some kind of social preferences? For some guidance on this question, we resort to one of the most prominent and tractable social preference models, proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . They show that in a standard linear public-good game, equilibria with positive contributions are possible if (some) players are inequality-averse. Furthermore, if punishment is possible on a second stage the restrictions on the model parameters for a cooperative equilibrium to ensue are considerably relaxed.
What does inequality-aversion imply for our dynamic game? We rst address this question for the dynNOpun game. There are two classes of equilibria which closely correspond to the equilibria presented by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) : (i) the omnilateral-defection equilibrium, and (ii) equilibria with completely symmetric contributions amongst a group of conditional cooperators who disregard potentially lower contribution levels by moneymaximizing players. For the parameters used in our study, there may not be any money-maximizing players within the group. According to the estimates by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , such group compositions are very unlikely.
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However, for the dynNOpun game, there is yet a third class of equilibria that may sound counter-intuitive at rst sight. In these equilibria, moneymaximizing players start out contributing their full endowment, while con-7 The condition for this class of equilibria to exist is obviously the same as spelt out by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for the one-shot game. ditional cooperators abstain from contributing positive amounts in the rst round. In following rounds, money-maximizers keep contributing their current wealth, while conditional cooperators mirror the formers' action from the respective preceding round. Only in the nal periods do money-maximizing players free-ride completely, while conditional cooperators choose their contributions as to equalize payos with the money-maximizers.
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To understand the intuition behind this class of equilibria, consider again the nal stage of the game. If conditional cooperators have higher nal-period contribution-capabilities than money-maximizers, the former will contribute part of their current wealth to close the`wealth gap', while the latter will obviously free-ride. In the preceding section we have pointed out that in dynNOpun, it may be protable for money-maximizing players to invest in the overall resource stock and free-ride only in the nal rounds. By mirroring the money-maximizers' contributions from the respective preceding round, conditional cooperators always choose the amount necessary to equalize wealth levels if all money-maximizers free-rode in the corresponding period. A thorough analysis of the proposed equilibrium is given in appendix B. Interestingly enough, these equilibria require conditions that are rather likely to be met, in stark contrast to those needed for cooperation in the oneshot game analyzed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) .
9 In other words, unlike in the`static' game the existence of inequality concerns could often lead to a high degree of cooperation.
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For a public-good game with punishment opportunities, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that equilibria exist in which all players contribute 8 In fact, this class of equilibria is more general than proposed here. Money-maximizers' equilibrium strategy could prescribe to contribute any arbitrary fraction of their wealth, as long as it is symmetric, and to stop contributing in period T −t . The conditionally cooperative players would mirror money-maximizers' contributions in the respective subsequent period and refrain from contributing positive amounts in all periods t > T −t +1. However, the most ecient of these equilibria is the one with full money-maximizer contributions and t = 1. Hence, this equilibrium would be chosen by the same equilibrium renement argument Fehr and Schmidt (1999) employ to choose the full-contribution equilibrium.
9 For the parameters used in our experiment, the likelihood of the preconditions for this equilibrium to be given amounts to roughly 35%, according to the type distribution suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . 10 In the absence of common knowledge of other players' types, this class of equilibria may vanish: selsh types could mimic the equilibrium strategy of the conditional cooperators, pretending to be one of them. However, if reciprocation in the nal round is rather doubtful, incentives for contributions by other selsh types are diluted. However, theoretic analyses of games using Fehr-Schmidt-type preferences usually assume common knowledge of types (most notably, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, themselves) . Rather than by its accuracy, this assumption has been justied by its predictive power. In light of this fact, we follow their example by making the assumption.
to the public good, given that at least some players have social preferences.
In particular, they contend that the`good' equilibrium stipulating full contributions by all players would be chosen by a reasonable renement argument.
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The prospects for such equilibria depend on the existence and the number of conditionally cooperative enforcers, the magnitude of their inequality preferences and the power of the punishment technology. In static public-good games with relatively small groups as used in most experimental studies (n = 4) and with a 1:3 punishment technology, the probability of a cooperative equilibrium is about eight times as high as in the game without punishment opportunities.
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Would we expect a similar eect for our treatments? The answer is no, for a number of reasons. First, as has been pointed out above, the prospects of a cooperative equilibrium in our dynNOpun game are relatively high. Therefore, the increase in the probability of a cooperative outcome resulting from the introduction of a punishment mechanism will be far more moderate. Second, consider the nal subgame. In case of very large wealth dierences, an enforcer may no longer have an incentive or may not be able to punish as much as would be required to equalize nal payos due to our convex punishment technology. In fact, as can be easily shown, the optimal punishment choice of a player only depends on the total number of players, the number of enforcers, and her aversion to inequality, but not on the size of the inequality (unless this inequality is small, in which case a corner solution may result). Hence, the enforceable nal-period contribution level is bounded from above. In contrast to the games most often played in the laboratory, this upper bound will tend to be given by enforcer preferences rather than by players' wealth.
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On the other hand, for the class of positive-contribution equilibria in the 11 Both p.842.
12 For the preference distribution suggested by Fehr and Schmidt, the probability for cooperation in a static public-good game amounts to about 20% (with n = 4, µ = 0.4, and a cost-to-punishment ratio of 1:3).
13 For the parameters used in our game in conjunction with the parameters suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , the largest possible optimal number of assigned points is 15.4 per punishing player for 3 enforcers, and 5.8 points per enforcing player for two such players. If there is a single enforcer, there will not be any point assignment, as the marginal costs of punishment (equal to 1/3 at 0 punishment points) are higher than the`enforcer's' marginal benet from punishment. Note, for comparison, that the average nal-round contribution-capability level amounts to over 2000 tokens. For the derivation of the optimal choice of punishment points, the interested reader is referred to the calculations of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , as a reproduction of their calculations would not provide any new insights. The only dierence between their case and ours is that the costs are no longer linear, and thus, we do not (necessarily) obtain a corner solution. dynNOpun game described above, the`equivalent' for the dynPUN game will display higher contribution levels, for two reasons: (i) payo-maximizers can be forced to contribute a certain level even in the nal period, and (ii) the threat of (partial) non-reciprocation in the nal period leading payomaximizers to contribute earlier on can partially be substituted for by the threat of sanction assignment. Thereby, the conditional cooperators are able to increase their own contributions in earlier periods beyond what is necessary to equalize payos for the case of defecting money-maximizers, in turn increasing the overall nal wealth level.
Research hypotheses
Our rst hypothesis reects the standard game-theoretic prediction. H 1. Under common knowledge of money-maximizing preferences and rationality, we expect to observe no contributions and no punishment.
Yet, the introduction of punishment opportunities enhances both the prospects of a cooperative outcome and the size of contributions in the repeated public-good games commonly used in the literature if parts of the population are motivated by social considerations. In contrast, in our game, the social-preference model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predicts a substantial dierence only in the achieved contribution levels. The predicted dierence in the probability of an outcome with non-negligible cooperation rates tends to be rather small. This leads to research hypothesis 2.
H 2. Under social preferences in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , average contribution levels are expected to be higher in the treatment with punishment possibilities. However, the number of groups attaining high levels of cooperation are not expected to dier between treatments.
Note that hypothesis 2 rests on equilibrium considerations that rely on a number of assumptions. Notably, they presume that there will not be any punishment actions, as the punishment threat is credible and sucient to deter deviations from the prescribed contribution levels. However, we know from the vast amount of experimental evidence on public-good games with punishment that these conditions are fullled hardly ever.
14 While the threat of sanctions is generally credible in the sense that subjects do assign punishment points, it is often not credible and sucient enough to induce high contributions early on in the experiment. At the same time, the eciency 14 For an overview, cf., e.g., Gächter and Herrmann (2009). costs of punishment are often so high that the average period payo is reduced below the no-contribution equilibrium level in early rounds. In a game in which contribution capabilities do not depend on earlier play, this characteristic often does not have an enduring eect, as stable or growing contribution levels insure that nal and often total earnings surpass those from the comparable game without sanctions.
15 In a game with endogenously evolving contribution capabilities, however, a conditionally cooperative enforcer has to strike a balance in the following trade-o: punishing a low-contributing player may induce higher future cooperation levels, but at the same time, it destroys parts of the future contribution capabilities of both the punisher and the punished player. This tension provides the base for two extreme benchmark scenarios that we will use to prepare research hypothesis 3.
The rst scenario pictures that a group falls prey to a`poverty-trap' due to excessive punishment. Punishers put too much weight on the cooperationenhancing eect of punishment, neglecting its costs. Heavy punishment in early rounds -as often reported in static settings -will not only decrease round-wise eciency but will have serious repercussions on subsequent contribution capabilities and thus, achievable wealth levels in subsequent rounds.
In other words, even if punishment leads to higher contributed fractions of current wealth (as it usually does), if it keeps wealth levels down, contributions will still be lower. Furthermore, even in the case of growing wealth levels, punishment will not necessarily lead to higher contributions in the long run; if the initial disadvantage is large enough, catching up with nonpunishing societies may take a very long time potentially longer than our experimental sessions. the same way more ecient cost-to-eect ratios do, which may in turn induce contributions to fall again even in the presence of an initially successful punishment mechanism (see e.g., the results of Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008, on dierent cost-to-eect ratios). Scen 1. Groups in dynPUN fall prey to a poverty trap, i.e., punishment actions diminish future contribution capabilities such that contributions remain below those in the dynNOpun treatment, while relative contributions (measured against players' current wealth) may or may not be higher. Consequently, payos will be lower in the treatment with punishment opportunities.
If, on the other hand, players foresee the detrimental eects harsh punishment in early periods may have, they may refrain from contribution enforcement, which may render the punishing mechanism ineective. Alternatively, punishment may not even be needed, given the increased incentives for cooperation provided by a combination of social preferences and dynamic incentives. In this case, punishment opportunities would not lead to a cooperationenhancing eect, either, but this time as a consequence of groups without punishment performing too well. Taking together the expected eects of dynamics fostering aggregate payos in a non-punishing world and of impeding the positive eects of punishment in a world where the latter is an option, we propose the following competing benchmark scenario: Scen 2. Players in dynPUN abstain from contribution enforcement in order to save the own and the group's resources. In consequence, the cooperationenhancing eect of punishment vanishes. Therefore, contributions in absolute and relative terms are non-distinguishable between the treatments, as are payos.
Both Scen1 and Scen2 constitute extreme scenarios of how peerpunishment may fail to promote the provision of a public good under endogeneously evolving contribution capabilities. Nevertheless, they illustrate working mechanisms that are plausible in light of the ample experimental evidence. Their gist is summarised in hypothesis 3.
H 3. The average contribution and payo levels in the treatment with punishment opportunities do not surpass those in the treatment without such opportunities.
An important feature of our study is that the game structure inherently leads to asymmetric wealth levels, unless all players cooperate to exactly the same degree. A widely-received feature of public-good studies with heterogeneous endowments is that rich participants typically contribute less in relative terms than poor participants do.
17 For our study, we expect this to hold in heterogeneous but not in homogeneous groups: in case there are (partial) free-riders as well as full-contributors, the assertion will hold true automatically, and if players have the often-assumed types pure cooperators, defectors, and punishers it will also be self-fullling. In contrast, in groups exclusively composed of either free-riders or full-contributors, we will not be able to make a statement of that kind. A comparison across groups, on the other hand, will most likely yield mixed results, given the rich will be a mixture of free-riders from mixed groups and full-contributors in more homogeneous groups. In other words, we expect to be forced to qualify the above assertion as a consequence of the endogeneity of subjects' (relative) wealth levels.
18 This is an important dierence to the setting of Sadrieh and Verbon return was set to µ = 0.4, and punishment costs were calculated according to the following formula:
This formula was chosen such as to preserve the standard cost-to-punishment ratio of 1:3 for low values of punishment points, but to reect a certain powerasymmetry under heterogeneous wealth levels: in real-life situations, it may be virtually impossible for a below-average earner to drive a rich man into bankruptcy. Under a linear 1:3 technology, however, nothing would prevent that. After observing others' contributions, subjects in the dynPUN treatment were asked to indicate the players they wanted to assign points to or to indicate that they did not want to assign points to any other player before being allowed to punish those players indicated. This was done to reduce a punishment-related experimenter-demand eect as much as possible.
Our experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007 ) and run at the Erfurt Laboratory for Experimental Economics (eLab). We ran 4
sessions, 2 for each of our treatments. A total of 72 subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . The instructions (see Appendix A) were handed out in written form before being read aloud by the experimenter.
After this, subjects were given the opportunity to go over the instructions again and ask any questions they might have. Questions were answered individually.
At the beginning of the experiment, each subject was assigned an identication letter (R, S, T, or U) that was kept constant over the course of the experiment. Assignment to groups was random and groups did not change during the entire session. We obtained 9 independent observations, i.e., matching groups, for each treatment. the maximum number of tokens that could be achieved in the experiment exceeded 400'000, while too low a rate may violate the dominance precept:
incentives would be too low to make monetary payos an important concern.
Imagine, for a moment, the case of a 1000:1 ratio, corresponding to a maximum potential gain of 400 Euros (compared to an average hourly wage of a student research assistant of 7.50 Euros). Recall that subjects are endowed with 20 tokens, corresponding to 2 Cents in our example. This could lead to a false perception by the subjects that their decisions throughout the experiment must result in a very small nal payment. Additionally, for a subject to obtain the hourly wage of a student assistant under this exchange rate, Having laid out the reasons for why it is necessary to have a non-linear exchange rate, let us state briey why we hold it is admissible to do so. Our perspective follows the spirit of Cubitt, Starmer, and Sugden's (1998, p. 116) isolation hypothesis that a subject treats every task within a multiple-task experiment as if it were the only task, and for real. are translated into lottery tickets for a grand lottery to be played out at the end thereby providing a ready explanation for evidence from binary-lottery scheme experiments that the scheme seems to induce higher risk aversion in subjects rather than inducing risk neutrality (as it should under the expectedutility hypothesis). In this view, subjects treat the experimental task as if the lottery tickets were monetary payo, abstracting from the fact that there is an additional intermediating mechanism. If the hypothesis holds, we may expect subjects also to abstract from conversion formulas for tokens as an additional layer of situational complexity. Of course, this can be expected to motivate subjects only if dominance holds, that is, if it is made clear at the outset that there is a substantial monetary incentive to do well in the experiment. In our experiment, this was stressed by a clear reference to the maximum potential earnings of 40 Euros in the instructions.
The sessions lasted approximately three quarters of an hour, average pay-21 For comparison: under our payo scheme, 20 tokens translate to 2.35 Euros, and it would take 8 rounds of full cooperation to obtain the equivalent to an hour's wage of a student assistant. ments being 8.30 Euros. Payments were settled individually to ensure players' anonymity. Also, no other information was given to the subjects that would enable them to connect the players in the game with the respective subjects in the session.
Results
As can be seen in gure 2, we can clearly reject hypothesis H1. In line with the previous literature, subjects contribute positive amounts to the public good in both treatments. In addition, gure 3 shows that subjects do invest in punishment when given the opportunity.
Performance and aggregate behavior
As a rst indicator for the performance in the two treatments, we focus on the average wealth levels. Figure 1a shows that they increase monotonically in both treatments. In the rst (second) quarter of the experiment, in dynPUN wealth levels are (weakly) signicantly lower than in dynNOpun (p-values by quarters are 0.0142, 0.0939, 0.2581, and 0.7304). In contrast to benchmark scenario Scen1, nal payos are not statistically dierent (p = 0.6914).
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Result 1. In an environment where contribution capabilities are determined by past contribution levels, groups under a peer-punishment mechanism suer an initial disadvantage in terms of their wealth level, compared to groups in a treatment without punishment opportunities. This dierence is made up for by the second half of the experiment.
In other words, groups in the dynPUN treatment manage to overcome an initial disadvantage, but they do not surpass the groups from the dynNOpun treatment. In relation to the potentially achievable wealth level, our subjects only obtain 1.14% (0.48%) in dynPUN (dynNOpun ; the gures are averages over group averages of nal wealth as a fraction of the socially optimal level). To obtain a better understanding of how these (non-)dierences in wealth levels and growth rates come about, let us turn to subjects' contribution decisions. Surprisingly, and contrary to both the ndings from previous research on peer-punishment in public-good games and our hypothesis H2but in line with hypothesis H3we do not nd signicant treatment dierences in terms of contributions in any of the 20 rounds.
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Result 2. When contribution capabilities are determined by past contribution levels, a peer-punishment mechanism does not increase contribution levels beyond those in a punishment-free environment. However, if we look at what subjects contribute as a part of their current capability, which we will refer to as relative contribution, we observe the well-known pattern of initially similar but diverging contribution paths. We illustrate this pattern in Figure 2 . In dynNOpun, average relative contributions start out at 43%, falling over time in what is almost a monotonic fashion to 17% in round 18, while they slightly increase from 37% to 41% during the same time period in dynPUN. Result 3. Average contributed fractions of current wealth do not fall over time in the presence of a peer-punishment mechanism, while they exhibit the typical declining trend in its absence. The dierence in relative contributions is signicant at the end of the experiment.
Still, the question remains of why this advantage does not translate into higher contributions within the time frame set by our design. Naturally, the answer has to be in the resources destroyed by punishment.
In Figure 3a , we depict the average fraction of public-good surplus destroyed by punishment actions (i.e., the sum of the punishers' costs and punished players' losses, as a fraction of the proceeds from the public good net of investments. As can be seen from the gure, more than half of a group's surplus is eaten up by punishment actions especially in the rst half of the experiment. Overall, an average of 62% of the groups' growth is lost, corroborating the argument leading to benchmark scenario Scen1. The fact that this problem is even more pronounced in the beginning of the experiment can account for the humble performance of the average dynPUN group and its diculty to outperform the average group in the dynNOpun treatment:
as stated before, it leads to a signicantly worse early-round performance of groups in dynPUN. This creates a disadvantage that is aggravated by the power-function character of our payo function as`production capacities' are determined by past performance.
24 A spearman correlation test between the average relative contribution and time over the whole experiment has a p-value of 0.0612. The fractions of maximum-contributions tell a similar story: while the fraction increases in dynPUN from 2.8% in round 1 to roughly 10% in the nal rounds, it plummets in dynNOpun from an initial 13.9% to 2.8% already in round 2, with only minor oscilations ever after. Result 4. On average, the use of punishment destroys 62% of a group's gains from cooperation, thereby explaining the uncommonly low level of contributions when compared to the punishment-free environment.
Another question concerns the impact such punishment has on the individual player, most importantly, how strongly received punishment aects a punished player's wealth. We depict this in Figure 3b , showing that on average, punished players are left with more than their wealth at the beginning of the round. Only in two rounds out of twenty do these players lose (slightly) more due to reduction points than what they have gained from the public good before the punishment stage. What does not happen, on average, is that punished players' wealth is brought to shrink. One reading of this nding is that punishers take care not to waste too many resources for future group production. To obtain a clearer picture of whether punishment is meted out in a more cautionary way than usual, we compare our data to data from a`static' experiment comparing dierent linear punishment technologies conducted by Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) . Knowing that a comparison of these dierent data sets has to be judged cautiously, we compare them for an indication of the main trends. Table 1 .
In our regression analysis, we regress a player's period-to-period change in relative contributions on a number of lagged variables that may be expected to inuence the player's decision. 27 We use relative contributions to make decisions comparable between rounds (and consequently, endowments;
we normalize most of the explanatory variables for the same reason). As potential explanatory variables we have three variables that measure deviations from the group average, each split up into a positive-and a negative-deviation variable, to account for the fact that reactions may dier depending on the player's position within the group. The rst variable measures the deviation of the player's relative contribution from the group members' average contribution, to capture conditionally cooperative behavior. The second variable measures the player's wealth standing, to account for the player's`historical' relative wealth level within society. Together with the variation coecient of the group's current contribution capabilities, this variable is to give an indication of how the endogenously arising inequality inuences behavior.
The third deviation-from-average variable is meant to capture whether being 26 The result for relative contributions is particularly intriguing for the following reason:
given sanctions are directed predominantly from high-to low-contributors, we would expect an increased fraction of positive reactions after punishment even for a player choosing her contributions randomly from any symmetric distribution over the range of possible contribution choices. Only players who always contribute a constant fraction of their wealth (which we do not observe) or players responding negatively to received punishment would not increase their relative contributions. On the other hand, players not being punished tend to be those with higher contributions. An increase in their relative contribution level would be expected to be less likely.
27 Only data from periods 1 to 19 is included, to keep our data as clean as possible from endgame eects. Signicance levels are indicated as follows: * * * 0.001, * * 0.01, * 0.05. are related, their combination allows for a more subtle picture of players' reaction to their peers' past contribution behavior. Additionally, we include the logarithm of the average capability to account for the current group level of prosperity, and the period to allow for potential time trends. In the rst model pertaining to the data from our dynPUN treatment, we add a dummy variable indicating whether the player had been sanctioned in the preceding round, as well as the fraction of the player's current (i.e., interim) wealth destroyed by others' assignments to explore the eects from our non-parametric tests in further detail.
Treatment dierences in high-contributor behavior. A nding that is common to both data sets is that negative deviations from the average surplus from the public good lead to signicantly lower contributions in the following round. This means that high-contributors show particularly negative reactions to wealthy free-riders, that is, to free-riders with a history of defecting. At the same time, having a history of being a high-contributor in dynNOpun, as evidenced by a comparatively low lagged contribution capability tends to lead to higher contributed fractions of wealth, similar to the results of Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) . However, this eect is being compensated by another eect found in this treatment, namely that having contributed a higher fraction of one's wealth than the other group members in the preceding period leads to a signicant reduction of relative contributions. In other words, in this treatment players are eager to adjust contribution levels downwards when they learn that their relative contribution had been comparatively high unless they are unconditional high-contributors, in which case relative contributions will tend to remain constant. With punishment being possible in dynPUN, contribution capabilities do not perform as an indicator for past contribution behavior in the same way as they do in dynNOpun. This may be a possible reason for why we do not see comparable eects in the regression on our dynPUN data, as not being able to separate between high-contributor types and sporadic high-contributors will drive up the variance of observed behavior (as can be seen from the higher standard errors of the respective dynPUN coecients, compared to those from the dynNOpun treatment).
Wealth eects and group heterogeneity. In terms of the level of prosperity within our small societies as measured by the logarithm of the group's average current contribution capability, we nd a signicant contributionfostering eect only in dynPUN. This eect seems to be owed to the fact that in the better-performing groups in this treatment, players' relative contribution levels exhibit a converging tendency. Given this convergence is towards higher contribution levels, and in light of the fact that it happens while the corresponding groups accumulate growing prosperity levels, growing capabilities will be associated with positive contribution changes. In light of this fact, the signicance of the reported eect is not surprising. On the other hand, taking a look at individual group data we see that in the nonpunishment groups, the attempts to induce a high level of group cooperation on the part of unconditional high-contributors by setting a good example are successful only to the degree that relative contribution levels in the respective groups tend to remain constant rather than decline as they do in other groups. The eects of heterogeneity. In contrast, an increase in the gap between poor and rich leads to less cooperative behavior only in dynNOpun.
An additional regression reported in appendix C that incorporates an interaction term between the period and heterogeneity of contribution capabilities suggests an explanation for the non-eect in dynPUN. Reactions to punishment. Finally, in terms of punishment our regression analysis (cf. 31 By controlling for players' contribution capability, we see that punishment does more than simply to increase relative contributions through its capability-decreasing nature. Furthermore, the size of the eect suggests that, for strong free-riders in otherwise high-contributing groups, punishment may lead to an increase in contributions even in absolute terms.
Discussion and Implications
In our paper, we set out to extend the existing body of research on behavior in social-dilemma situations in an important direction. In a public-good game we introduce dynamics by letting a player's contribution capabilities depend on that player's and her group's past behavior. This was done to reect a feature of many everyday dilemmas, namely that tomorrow's contribution capabilities may depend on today's decisions. In this environment, we examine the eects of a punishment technology to explore whether punishment has the same contribution-enhancing eect as in the static setting even though the preconditions seem to be worse. Corresponding to the combined eect of a divergence in relative contribution levels and the diminishing trend of surplus destroyed due to punishment in the dynPUN groups, we observe increasing growth rates in the punishment environment, contrasting with falling rates in dynNOpun. At the end of our experiment, wealth levels in dynPUN are higher, even though this dierence
is not large enough to yield a statistically signicant dierence (Result 1).
Nonetheless, the evidence in favour of hypothesis H3 is weak as it seems merely a question of time when the dierence in contributions and, subsequently, wealth levels is strong enough to be statistically discernible.
Punished players' reactions are independent of the number of sanctioning players, only depending on their total size. Furthermore, the increase in relative contributions is more than just a consequence of reduced capabilities coupled with a xed level of contributions. In other words, punishment does have a contribution-enhancing eect that goes beyond pure embellishment. We have embarked on this inquiry into the eects of a punishment mechanism in a dynamic public-good game in which players' contribution capabilities are endogenously determined. On the one extreme, our benchmark scenario Scen1 postulated the level of punishment would be so high that endowments could shrink over time and contributions would be lower than in the treatment without punishment in spite of signicantly higher relative contribution levels. On the other, scenario Scen2 postulated we would not observe punishment, as potential punishers would be too concerned about maintaining future contribution capabilities.
Our main results lie in between, suggesting a benecial eect of punishment if the time horizon is long enough. Does this mean our scenarios were completely unjustied? The answer is no. While we do not observe any group in which wealth levels actually decrease, there was one group in dynPUN in which all individual relative contributions are well above the median (and average) relative contribution from the dynNOpun treatment for most of the time and yet, this group's wealth levels stay as low as in the second-worst performing dynNOpun group. On the other extreme, we have a group in which punishment was virtually never used before the kicking in of the end-game eect in round 19.
A Instructions to the experiment General information
• This experiment consists of 20 rounds with 2 stages each.
• At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned to one of the groups of four participants each. During the whole experiment, you will interact only with the members of your group. However, at no time, you will be informed about the identities of your group.
• You will be assigned an identity letter: R, S, T, or U that will be kept constant during the whole experiment.
• At the beginning of the experiment, 18 experimental tokens, (your starting endowment), will be assigned to your experimental (wealth) account. Additionally, in each round you will receive a round endowment of 2 tokens. Hence, your wealth account in the very rst Your wealth at the end of the round Your wealth at the end of the round consists of the following parts:
• your wealth account after Stage 1
• minus your costs of assignment for the tokens you assigned 
Information
At the end of each round you will be informed about
• the wealth accounts of all members of your group
• the contributions of all your group members,
• the wealth accounts of all group members after Stage 1
• the tokens each group member received from other members (but you will not know who assigned these tokens) and
• the wealth accounts of all group members after Stage 2
After the feedback, the next round begins.
At the end of the experiment your wealth account will be transformed into Euros according to the following formula: Your earnings in Euro = (Your wealth in tokens) 2/7
Hence, your cash earnings will lie between 0,00 Euros and 40,00 Euros.
You have now a couple of minutes of time to go over again the instructions.
If you should have some questions, please do not hesitate to inform us by raising your hand. In this case we will come in to your cabin to clarify the question. Please note that any kind of communication with other participants is prohibited.
We wish you success! B Proof of existence of the equilibrium proposed for the dynNOpun game (intended for online publication only)
Consider a group of n players, interacting over T rounds in the dynNOpun game as presented in the main part of the paper. In this appendix, we set out to show that under relatively mild conditions, there is a class of equilibria with positive contribution levels if there are ν conditional cooperators, with ν = min{j ∈ N|j > (1 − µ)/µ}, and k money-maximizing players, k = n − ν, where conditional cooperators and money-maximizers are dened as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In fact, these equilibria may exist even for k/(n − 1) > µ/2, in which case Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have shown that in the standard non-repeated linear public-good game, no equilibrium with positive contributions exists despite the presence of players with social preferences.
In these equilibria, all money-maximizers choose a symmetric contribution x t mm , up to an arbitrary round T − t , and zero-contributions ever after. On the equilibrium path, the ν conditional cooperators always mirror the money-maximizers' behavior from the respective preceding round. The equilibrium yielding the highest and symmetric payos for all players is given by t = 1 and x t mm = E t mm , ∀t ≤ T − t , where E t mm is the money-maximizers' round-t contribution capability. By a similar renement argument as employed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , we shall focus our attention on this particular equilibrium in the following.
Before we formulate our main proposition, we will introduce lemma 1 that will be helpful in our proof of the proposition. Lemma 1. If a conditionally cooperative player i is the single wealthiest player in her group, she will choose to equalize payos with the next-wealthiest player (independent of whether this is a single player or a group), provided her coecient for disadvantageous inequality, β i , fullls
Proof. It does not pay for the conditional cooperator to contribute less than necessary to equalize payos with the next-wealthiest player, as any token contributed to the public good makes her lose (1 − µ) in monetary terms, but gains her β i /(n − 1) utility units for each player who is less wealthy than herself. Given she is the wealthiest person in the group, her total gains are β i units for each token contributed. By denition, a player is a conditional cooperator if and only if β +µ > 1 holds.
33 To contribute more than would be necessary to equalize payos with a group of n next-wealthiest players, with 1 ≤ n ≤ n − 1, her additional monetary loss from contributing an additional token, (1 − µ), plus her utility loss from disadvantageous inequality vis-à-vis the n formerly next-wealthiest players, n α i /(n − 1), would have to be less than her utility gains from advantageous inequality with respect to the remaining players in the group, (n−1−n )β i n−1 . We require that this is not the case. Clearly, this requirement is strongest for n = 1. Simple calculus shows that this requirement holds as long as
However, given the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) species β i ≤ α i , it is obvious that inequality (2) is sucient for (3) to hold.
Note that in our experiment, n = 4 and µ = 0.4. Thus, inequality (2) reads as β i < 1.8. By construction of the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , β i ≤ 1. Therefore, the requirement (2) obviously will be met for any player conforming to the model. Proposition 1. Let a group of n members consist of ν conditional cooperators and k money-maximizing players, where ν = min{j ∈ N|j > (1 − µ)/µ} and k = n − ν. Then, the following conditions are sucient (yet not necessary) for positive-contribution equilibria to exist:
(1 − µ) for all ν conditional cooperators.
In these equilibria, a conditionally cooperative player does not contribute if there is a player wealthier than herself, nor if all players have the same wealth levels. If there are players who are less wealthy than the conditional cooperator, she chooses her contributions such as to equalize wealth levels with the wealthiest money-maximizing player if that player did not contribute a positive amount, or with the next-wealthiest conditional cooperator having a dierent wealth level than herself, whoever of the two is wealthier.
The k money-maximizers always contribute fully to the public good in periods 1 to T − 1, as long as all ν conditional cooperators stick to their equilibrium strategy. Otherwise, the money maximizers stop contributing. This gives rise to the following behavior on the equilibrium path: all k money-maximizers always contribute fully to the public good in periods 1 to T − 1, while the conditionally cooperative players always contribute the amount necessary to equalize wealth levels in case the money-maximizing players failed to contribute in the current round. This amount is exactly the amount contributed by the money-maximizing player in the preceding round. In other words, if all k money-maximizers are endowed with a given wealth level E t k and all conditional cooperators had a level of E t ν on their accounts in any given round t, t ≤ T − 1, then the former (latter) would contribute
k must hold for the latter to contribute a positive amount, which is fullled in the proposed equilibrium). In the nal round, money maximizers do not contribute, and conditional cooperators contribute as to equalize payos over all players.
Proof. First of all, consider a money-maximizing player j. Obviously, in the nal round this player does not have an incentive to deviate from her equilibrium strategy, as the nal round is equivalent to a one-shot linear public-good game and in this class of games, free-riding is a dominant strategy. Next, we show that a money-maximizing player j does not have an incentive to deviate from her equilibrium strategy in round T − 1. Given their equilibrium strategy, all ν conditionally cooperative players will choose to contribute in round T any amount contributed by the least-contributing money-maximizer in round T − 1, as this leads to an equalization of payos with the latter. At the same time, all money-maximizing players other than j will choose to contribute everything on their current account. If j chooses to deviate, she will therefore determine conditional cooperators' choices in round T . Therefore, contributing in T − 1 will pay o if and only if the gain from reducing her contribution by a single token, (1 − µ), is smaller than the gains from conditional cooperators' subsequent matching contributions, νµ. This condition is equivalent to ν > (1 − µ)/µ, which is true by the denition of ν in proposition 1. In fact, this argument holds for any round t, given the least-contributing money-maximizer's contributions are always matched by conditional cooperators in t + 1. Now, consider a conditionally cooperating player i. To answer the question of whether she has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy,
we start with an analysis of the nal round. In round T , the proposed equilibrium strategy leads to an equal distribution of wealth. If condition (III) holds, we know by lemma 1 that no conditional cooperator has an incentive unilaterally to provide less than the prescribed level, as she will maximize her utility by contributing as much as necessary to equalize payos with respect to the second-wealthiest individual. On the other hand, a conditional cooper-ator does not have an incentive unilaterally to provide more than prescribed by the equilibrium strategy, given this would leave the cooperator worse o both in monetary terms and in terms of (disadvantageous) inequality.
What the preceding paragraphs have shown is that (i) money-maximizers do not have an incentive to deviate from the strategy prescribed by proposition 1 throughout the game, and (ii) conditional cooperators do not have an incentive to deviate from their prescribed strategy in round T . What remains to be shown is that the latter do not have an incentive to deviate in earlier rounds. First of all, consider a single conditional cooperator providing q tokens less than prescribed in round T −1. While this deviation will not change the behavior of money-maximizing players given their round-T contributions will be zero irrespective of what other players do, it will lead to defection also on the part of the remaining players. In this situation, by lemma 1 the deviating player's best response will be to provide q tokens in the nal round.
By doing so, the nal situation will be the same as the situation before the nal round under equilibrium play. The dierence between this situation and the equilibrium outcome is that conditional cooperators are better o than money-maximizers in monetary terms, namely by the latters' round-(T − 1)
contributions. This leads to a utility gain compared to the equilibrium of
, where x * ,T −1 κ is a money-maximizer's equilibrium contribution in T − 1. For the strategy prole proposed in proposition 1 to be an equilibrium, this term must not be positive, which is equivalent to requiring
for all ν conditional cooperators. The lowest-possible β i is β i = 1 − µ, by denition of a conditional cooperator. Substituting this into inequality (4), we obtain
This requirement will obviously be fullled for the parameter values used in our experiment, given it corresponds to condition (I) from the proposition under the smallest-possible value of ν, (1 − µ)/µ.
The next question to be answered is whether a conditional cooperator has an incentive to`under-provide' relative to her prescribed strategy in an earlier round. In this case, she would deter further contributions from both money-maximizers and conditional cooperators, herself only closing the resulting wealth gap vis-à-vis the other cooperators. The resulting payos correspond to the equilibrium current wealth levels of that round in case the conditional cooperator had not deviated. In other words, by contributing less than prescribed, a conditional cooperator can x the payo vector at the equilibrium current wealth level of a given round. We know from the above that the conditional cooperator prefers the equilibrium outcome to the current wealth levels before the nal round. What we have to show is that she also prefers the equilibrium outcome to the equilibrium current wealth levels at the end of any round t, t < T . We do this by showing that she, in fact, always prefers equilibrium current wealth levels in t + 1 to those in t, t < T − 1 (recall that we have already shown this for t = T − 1).
Denote by E 
is smaller than her utility from the payo vector E t+1 . This is equivalent to requiring 
Reorganizing (5) yields
In the following, we show why inequality (6) will always be fullled under the conditions specied in the proposition. Consider rst the sum of the second and third terms on the left-hand side of the inequality. By denition of ν, µν − 1 ≥ −µ, and therefore,
Under condition (I) from the proposition, it can be easily seen that the right-hand side of (7) will be larger or equal to zero even for the smallestpossible β i a conditional cooperator can have, i.e. β i = 1 − µ. Let us now turn to the rst term in (6) . Obviously, this term will be positive if µ − β i /(n − 1) > 0 for all possible values of β i . In constructing their model, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) introduced the restriction that β i ≤ 1.
Substituting the maximum-possible value for β i , we directly obtain condition (II) from the proposition. In other words, under the conditions specied in proposition 1, the sum on the left-hand side of inequality (6) will always be positive. Thus, a conditional cooperator will never have an incentive to deviate contributing less than under the equilibrium strategy, thereby inducing a payo vector that equals the equilibrium wealth-level vector of any earlier round t, t < T . Note that in our derivations, we have used a number of conservative approximations. Therefore, the true parameter space for which the equilibrium exists, will be larger than our conditions suggest.
What remains to be shown is that no conditionally cooperating player has an incentive to contribute more than specied by the equilibrium strategy prescribed by proposition 1. We have already done so for the nal period.
Consider period T − 1. If a conditionally cooperating player contributes more than prescribed in our proposition, this will not have any eect on money-maximizers' behaviour, given the latter will not contribute any positive amounts in the nal round independent of her choice. If the player contributes to her full capacity, she is equally well o as any money-maximizer.
In the nal period, the remaining conditional cooperators will equalize wealth levels, such that no inequality will arise. Furthermore, the resulting wealth levels will be as high as in the equilibrium, such that the conditional cooperator will be equally well o, given the only change is the point in time when reciprocation happens. To see this, note that nothing out of the returns from the`over-contributed' amount is used for contributions, as contributions are determined by the wealth dierence between money-maximizers and conditional cooperators. This dierence, however, is not aected by the deviating player's contribution. While this means that the strategy prescribed by our proposition is (at best) a weak best-response, this does not aect the existence of the proposed equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the deviating cooperator chooses less than her full capability, there are two possibilities.
If there are still more than one conditional cooperators left, they stop to contribute by lemma 1, as the next-wealthy player will be one of their peers.
If only one conditional cooperator is left, she will choose to equalize wealth levels with the deviating cooperator, evidently being next-wealthy player.
However, this will diminish her nal-period contribution. Consequently, the nal payo allocation would leave the deviating player worse o in monetary terms, at the same time inducing inequality. Clearly, following the equilibrium strategy gives the player a higher utility.
Finally, consider any period T −t , t ≥ 2. If a conditional cooperator contributes more than specied in proposition 1, an argument that is analogous to the one presented in the preceding paragraph shows that the conditional cooperator cannot induce a payo vector that leaves him better o than the wealth-level vector that would result in equilibrium after period T − t + 1.
However, in our discussion of the case of`under-provision' on the part of a conditional cooperator, we have seen two things: given all other players follow their equilibrium strategy, a conditional cooperator can always induce a payo vector that is equal to the equilibrium wealth-level vector after any arbitrary period; and the cooperator will never do so, as doing so would never leave him better o under the conditions specied in the proposition. Therefore, a conditional cooperator cannot possibly reach a higher utility level than in equilibrium by contributing more than specied in the equilibrium strategy. Evidently, this holds for all rounds t, t ∈ {1, ..., T }.
Remark: The threat of money-maximizing players stopping to contribute in response to over-contributions by conditional cooperators is not as incredible as it may seem at rst sight. The number of conditional cooperators in our equilibrium, ν, has been specied to be minimal with respect to the number of cooperators necessary to make contributions in a given period t, t < T, pay o for money-maximizing players. If one of these cooperators contributes fully in period t, the cooperator will no longer match the moneymaximizers' contributions in t + 1. Given ν is`minimal' in the sense specied above, the money-maximizer would be better o free-riding in t. Therefore, for the equilibrium to exist, conditional cooperators must not destroy the money-maximizers' incentives for cooperation stemming from the formers' reciprocity by`over-contributing' early on.
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